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Abstract 
This study presents an empirical analysis of the cost efficiency of a sample of 
Swiss multi-utilities operating in the distribution of electricity, natural gas and water. 
The multi-utilities that operate in different sectors are characterized by a strong unob-
served heterogeneity. Therefore the measurement of their performance poses an im-
portant challenge for the regulators. The purpose of this paper is to study the potential 
advantages of recently developed panel data stochastic frontier models in the meas-
urement of the level of efficiency for multi-utility companies. These models are esti-
mated for a sample of 34 multi-output utilities operating from 1997 to 2005. The al-
ternative models are compared regarding the cost function slopes and inefficiency es-
timates. For the inefficiency estimates, the correlation between different models and 
the effect of econometric specification have been analyzed. The results suggest that 
the inefficiency estimates are substantially lower when the unobserved firm-specific 
effects are taken into account.  
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1. Introduction    
Along with the recent waves of liberalization and deregulation in network in-
dustries throughout Europe, the authorities are increasingly concerned about the cost 
efficiency1 of the utilities that, due to their natural monopoly characteristics, are not 
fully liberalized. Because of their considerable economies of scale, a direct introduc-
tion of competition is not optimal in sectors such as power, gas and water distribution. 
Instead, incentive regulation can be used to ensure (or maximize) the productive effi-
ciency of the locally monopolistic companies. Unlike the traditional contracting sys-
tems based on a reasonable Rate of Return, the incentive contracts are designed to in-
duce incentives for reducing costs and increasing efficiency. Most incentive regula-
tion schemes use benchmarking to evaluate the productive performance of the regu-
lated companies in order to reward/punish them accordingly. Based on their efficiency 
performance, companies are allowed to keep some of their profits/savings through 
either differentiated price caps or adjustments in budget or network access fees.  
Several European countries have introduced incentive regulation schemes only 
in the electricity sector (Farsi, Fetz and Filippini, 2007a; Crouch, 2007), some others 
also in the water and gas sectors (Saal et al., 2007; Antonioli and Filippini, 2001, 
Casarin, 2007). Although Switzerland has not yet implemented any incentive regula-
 
1 Consistent with the economics literature on production theory (e.g. Farrel, 1957; Chambers, 1988) here, the term 
efficiency is referred to the efficiency in production or productive efficiency. In this context, the definition of effi-
ciency is not based on optimality in an economic system in the Pareto sense (as in Debreu, 1951), but as noted by 
Fried et al. (2008), is the relative difference between the firm’s observed inputs/outputs and the optimal production 
plan from the firm’s standpoint. This relative efficiency in terms of costs is generally defined as cost efficiency 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). While it is important to distinguish this concept from Pareto efficiency, the alter-
native term cost effectiveness (e.g. Kopsakangas-Savolainen and Svento, 2008) might lead to certain confusion, 
because of the common usage of that term in other strands of economics literature, as a comparative measure of 
cost-benefit or input-output ratios among several technologies (or policies). In general, cost effectiveness aims at 
finding the best technology, whereas cost efficiency or in general, productive efficiency is used to assess various 
possible plans of production using similar technologies that can ideally be characterized as a single technology.  
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tion system, the actual debates suggest that the regulators will probably follow similar 
reforms in the near future.2  
In spite of a relatively common usage in each one of the distribution sectors, 
the direct application of benchmarking analysis in the regulation of multi-utilities has 
hardly been explored. This is especially interesting in Switzerland and some other 
European countries, where multi-utilities dominate the distribution sectors in electric-
ity, natural gas and water. In general, given the differentiated pace of regulatory re-
forms in electricity, gas and water sectors, the multi distribution utilities are regulated 
with instruments that vary across the three sectors of activity.3  
To our knowledge there is no reported empirical application of efficiency 
measurement in the multi-utility sector. This may perhaps be considered in line with 
arguments in favor of unbundling the multiple-utilities into separate legal entities. In 
fact, horizontal unbundling is a recurring subject of the public policy debates both in 
the EU and Switzerland. However, the dominance of multi-utilities in Switzerland is 
not expected to be affected by the ongoing reforms. According to the observed ten-
dencies in the EU regulatory reforms, the multi-utilities especially those with moder-
ate and small networks (less than 100,000 customers), will remain exempt from un-
bundling requirements. 
Noting the dominance of multi-utilities operating in electricity, gas and water 
distribution in Switzerland and in some other European countries, an important ques-
tion is whether the benchmarking methods can be applied to multi-utilities as well as 
single-output distribution utilities. From a technical point of view it is possible to per-
form an analysis of cost efficiency for a sample of multi-utilities. Provided that there 
 
2 For instance, from the beginning of 2009 several changes will be implemented in the electricity sec-
tor. These reforms allow the regulation authority at the federal level to use benchmarking analysis for 
the acceptance of the tariffs.  
3 In particular, the Swiss government has not yet undertaken any reform initiative for the gas and water 
sectors. This implies that the distribution tariffs in these two sectors will continue to be regulated di-
rectly by the local municipality with a rate-of-return approach. See Farsi and Filippini (2007) for more 
details. 
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are a sufficient number of multi-utilities for a sensible global benchmarking analysis, 
one could argue that at least theoretically a “global” benchmarking provides more re-
liable results compared to a “sectorial” approach, to the extent that the integrated 
multi-utilities are more comparable to each other than to specialized companies that 
do not use the potential synergies across the sectors. However, as we will discuss 
later, the strong heterogeneity of the production process of this type of utilities can 
create some difficulties.  
Moreover, in practice, if the historical development of regulation systems can 
be a guide, the sectorial approach has clear advantages regarding implementation and 
political acceptance. In fact, in several European countries, including Switzerland, 
separate regulation authorities for gas, electricity and water have been created. Some 
of these authorities use incentive regulation schemes that make use of inefficiency 
estimates while some others adopt traditional regulation systems such as rate of return 
regulation. In order to provide clear information to the individual regulation authority, 
the governments have generally required the multi-utilities to introduce an accounting 
unbundling of their activities. This implies that each individual regulator can perform 
a benchmarking analysis of the cost only for the sector of a multi-utility for which it is 
responsible. For instance, the Swiss regulation authority for the electricity sector 
(ELCOM) could perform a benchmarking analysis only for the electricity sector of the 
multi-utility.  
However, the main problem of this sectorial approach results from the fact that 
in most cases only the electricity sector is regulated with incentive regulation 
schemes, in which case the multi-output companies could artificially shift part of the 
costs to the water and gas sectors for which the regulation does not foresee a bench-
marking analysis. In these cases there is a clear risk that the incentive regulation in-
strument loses its effectiveness. To overcome this problem the regulators could con-
sider combining the efficiency analysis of individual sectors with a global benchmark-
ing for the whole company. Such combined analyses can throw some light on the pat-
terns of inefficiency as well as cost shifting behavior. For instance, a large discrep-
ancy between the inefficiency estimates of a given company (at the global and sec-
toral levels) could be interpreted as an indication of cost shifting behavior.  
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The effectiveness of such regulation systems relies upon the accuracy of esti-
mated efficiency levels of individual companies. However, due to a great variety of 
available methods of efficiency measurement and the observed discrepancy of results 
across different methods, benchmarking practice requires a methodology to adopt a 
single model among several legitimate approaches and specifications. This task is par-
ticularly complicated in network utilities in which unobserved firm-specific factors 
might be confounded with inefficiency. Obviously the problem of unobserved hetero-
geneity is more important in multi-output distributors that operate in several networks, 
each of which could have different types of cost drivers with specific characteristics.  
Unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity can be taken into account with conven-
tional fixed or random effects in a panel data model. In order to distinguish external 
heterogeneities from cost efficiency, Greene (2005a) proposed a model that integrates 
an additional stochastic term representing inefficiency in both fixed and random ef-
fects models.4 These models assume that the firm-specific heterogeneity does not 
change over time but sources of inefficiency vary both across firms and over time. In 
this paper we use a ‘true random-effects’ model (TRE), which is a random-constant 
frontier model, obtained by combining a conventional random-effects model with a 
skewed stochastic term representing inefficiency. The extended model includes sepa-
rate stochastic terms for latent heterogeneity and inefficiency.  
The empirical results reported in the literature obtained from TRE models sug-
gest that modeling unobserved heterogeneity could significantly decrease the ineffi-
ciency estimates.5 This could lend certain support to the application of benchmarking 
methods in the regulation of strongly heterogeneous network industries, in which the 
conventional inefficiency estimates appear to be overstated. Provided that they can 
sufficiently control for the unobserved heterogeneity across firms, these methods can 
 
4 Kumbhakar (1991) proposed a similar approach using a three-stage estimation procedure. See also 
Heshmati and Kumbhakar (1994) and Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1995) for two applications 
5 See for instance Greene (2004), Farsi, Filippini and Kuenzle (2005) and Alvarez, Arias and Greene 
(2004). 
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be used to have a better estimate of inefficiency. However, the assumption that the 
time invariant part is heterogeneity rather than inefficiency could be unrealistic in 
cases where the persistent inefficiency is considerable. Therefore, it is crucial to com-
pare the results with those obtained from other models that consider the time-invariant 
unexplained excess costs as inefficiency. In this paper we use random effects models 
proposed by Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and Pitt and Lee (1981), assuming time-
invariant inefficiencies and Battese and Coelli (1992) that allows for a uniform de-
cline of inefficiency with time. Unlike TRE, these models do not allow for a separate 
time-invariant term, thus probably overstating the inefficiency. On the other hand, 
cost inefficiency is probably under-estimated in the TRE model. As we will discuss in 
Section 4, the results considered together could provide plausible lower and upper 
bounds for the inefficiency of single multi-utilities.   
The purpose of this paper is to study the potential advantages of benchmarking 
models particularly the extended models such as Greene (2005) in an application to 
Switzerland’s multi-output utilities. The models are estimated for a sample of 34 
companies operating in Switzerland from 1997 to 2005. The alternative models are 
compared regarding the cost function slopes and inefficiency estimates. For the ineffi-
ciency estimates, the correlation between different models and the effect of economet-
ric specification have been analyzed. The results suggest that the inefficiency esti-
mates are substantially lower when the unobserved firm-specific effects are taken into 
account.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model 
specification and the methodology. The data are explained in section 3. Section 4 pre-
sents the estimation results and discusses their implications, and section 5 provides the 
conclusions.  
2. Stochastic frontier models for panel data 
The methods used for measuring technical, allocative and cost efficiency are 
commonly referred to as frontier approaches, classified into two main categories of 
7 
linear programing methods and econometric approaches.6 The latter group, also 
known as Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) is easily adaptable to panel data struc-
ture and therefore used in this study. In SFA models, first developed by Aigner, Lov-
ell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), the regression re-
siduals are decomposed into a symmetric component representing statistical noise and 
a skewed term one representing inefficiency.  
As opposed to cross-sections, in panel data the repeated observation of the same 
company over time allows an estimation of unobserved firm-specific factors, which 
might affect costs but are not under the firm’s control. Individual companies operate 
in different regions with various environmental and network characteristics that are 
only partially observed. It is crucial for the regulator to disentangle such exogenous 
heterogeneities from inefficiency estimates. However the distinction between these 
two unobserved terms requires certain assumptions based on judgment. In early appli-
cations of SFA models to panel data (Pitt and Lee, 1981; Schmidt and Sickles, 1984; 
Battese and Coelli, 1988), the common assumption was that the productive efficiency 
is a time-invariant characteristic that can be captured by firm-specific effects in a ran-
dom or fixed effects model.  
A general form of a cost frontier based on these models can be written as:  
  ln Cit = f (yit, wit ) + ui + vit.     (1), 
where subscripts i and t denote the firm and the operation year, C is the cost variable 
usually in logarithms and y and w are respectively vectors of outputs and input factor 
prices. The time-varying error component vit , typically a normal variable, represents 
the unobserved heterogeneity and random errors, whereas the time-invariant term ui is 
assumed to represent excess costs due to inefficiency. The latter term is considered 
with different distributions: While Pitt and Lee (1981) adopt a half-normal distribu-
tion that is, a normal distribution truncated at zero. Battese and Coelli (1988) extends 
the model to non-zero truncation points and Schmidt and Sickles (1984) propose two 
 
6 Murillo-Zamorano (2004) provides an account of advantages and shortcomings of each group. Other 
interseting surveys are Coelli et al. (2005), Simar (1992) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). 
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variations in which they relax the distribution assumptions respectively using Gener-
alized Least Squares (GLS) and fixed-effect estimators. In particular, in the latter 
model, the individual effects ui can be correlated with the explanatory variables.  
In more recent papers the random effects model has been extended to include 
time-variant inefficiency. Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990), Kumbhakar (1990), 
and Battese and Coelli (1992) are the important contributions that consider a time 
function to account for variation of efficiency. In particular the former paper proposes 
a flexible function of time with parameters varying among firms. In all these models, 
however, the unobserved external heterogeneity is suppressed in an iid error term 
across observations. This implies that the cost variations due to factors other than 
firm’s efficiency are randomly assigned to each observation. This could be a restric-
tive assumption in network industries in which certain external cost drivers specific to 
environment and/or network complexity remain practically unchanged over fairly 
long periods of time.  
To the extent that environmental factors and network characteristics do not 
change considerably over time, associating the time-invariant excess costs to external 
factors rather than inefficiency can be a sensible assumption. On the other hand, im-
provements in efficiency are usually linked to a dynamic learning process and adapta-
tion to new technologies. While recognizing that these learning processes are rela-
tively slow without adequate incentive regulation, we contend the managers’ incen-
tives for improvement are partly driven by the ubiquitous policy debates, expected 
regulatory reforms and criticisms by monitoring authorities.7 Therefore, it is assumed 
that inefficiencies are captured by the time-varying excess costs. These assumptions 
combined with the distribution assumption in line with the original frontier model al-
 
7  In fact like many other European countries, in Switzerland, following the government’s policy direc-
tives to introduce more competition in the electricity sector, since about the middle of the 1990’s the 
public utilities have initiated internal re-organization mechanisms to improve competitiveness.    
9 
low a disentanglement of inefficiencies from firm-specific heterogeneity captured by 
panel’s individual effects.8  
In fact, the SFA model in its original form (Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt, 1977) 
can be readily extended to panel data models, by adding a fixed or random effect in 
the model. Although similar extensions have been proposed by several previous au-
thors,9 Greene (2005a,b) provides effective numerical solutions for both models with 
random and fixed effects, which he respectively refers to as “true” fixed and random 
effects models. Several recent studies such as Greene (2004), Farsi, Filippini and 
Kuenzle (2005), Alvarez, Arias and Greene (2004) and Tsionas (2002) have followed 
this line. Some of these models have proved a certain success in a broad range of ap-
plications in network industries in that they give more plausible efficiency estimates.10 
These results raise an important question as to what extent the panel-data-adapted 
models can be used to have a better understanding of the inefficiencies and whether 
they can provide a reliable basis for benchmarking and incentive regulation systems in 
industries characterized by strong heterogeneity. This question is especially important 
in the multi-utility sector, in which the companies operate in multiple networks, en-
tailing several network-specific heterogeneity dimensions.  
Greene’s (2005a) ‘true’ cost frontier model can be written as:  
  ln Cit = f (yit, wit) +αi+ uit + vit,.      (2) 
The term (αi) is a normal i.i.d.  in random-effects framework, or a constant parameter 
in fixed-effects approach. uit  and vit are respectively a half-normal variable represent-
 
8 There are evidently other feasible econometric specifications that can incorporate these assumptions. 
A remarkable example is the flexible framework proposed by Sickles (2005).       
9 In particular Kumbhakar (1991) proposed a three-stage estimation procedure to solve the model with 
time- and firm-specific effects, Polachek and Yoon (1996) estimated a panel data frontier model with 
firm dummies and Heshmati (1998) used a two-step procedure in a random-effect framework to sepa-
rate the firm-specific effects from efficiency differences.  
10 See Saal, Parker and Weyman-Jones (2007), Farsi, Filippini and Greene (2006), Farsi, Filippini and 
Kuenzle (2006) and Farsi, Filippini and Greene (2005) for applications in water distribution, electricity 
networks, bus transport and railroads respectively. 
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ing inefficiency and a normal random variable that captures the statistical noise. In 
this study, we used the true random effect model, mainly because the numerical solu-
tion of the fixed effects model was cumbersome and did not converge to sensible re-
sults for the estimates of inefficiencies and individual intercepts. In order to provide a 
basis for comparing the results, three other models namely, Pitt and Lee (1981), Bat-
tese and Coelli (1992) and a GLS model in line with Schmidt and Sickles (1984) have 
also been considered. These models will be described in the next section.  
 
3. Data and model specification 
The data used in this study includes financial and technical information from a 
sample of electricity, natural gas and water distribution companies that have operated 
in Switzerland between 1997 and 2005. The data have been mainly collected from the 
annual reports. Information on the size of the firm’s distribution area is from the 
“Arealstatistik 2002” published by the Federal Statistical Office and the “Preisüber-
wacher”. The original data set covers about 90 companies covering about 42% of total 
electricity, 67% of total gas and 22% of total water distribution in Switzerland. That 
sample includes multi-utility firms as well as specialized companies in electricity, gas 
and water sectors and several double-output utilities, but excludes companies with 
more than 10% self-generation of total electricity distribution.   
Since the focus of this study is on the horizontal integrated multi-utilities, we 
focused on a sub-sample of the data used by Farsi, Fetz and Filippini (2008),11 includ-
ing observations from 34 companies. Moreover, as pointed out by Saal and Parker 
(2006) assuming a similar cost frontier among multi-output companies and special-
ized utilities is not a realistic assumption and might cause considerable distortion in 
efficiency estimates and ranking. Because the primary purpose of this analysis is the 
 
11 In that study we analyzed the economies of scope and scale in Swiss multi-utilities using a quadratic 
cost function without performing a frontier analysis. In contrast with the present study, the estimation 
of the economies of scope requires data from the integrated multi-utilities as well as specialized dis-
tributors. Pooling the data across different types of utilities is not appropriate for a benchmarking 
analysis that relies on comparing comparable companies.  
11 
estimation of cost-efficiency, we did not pool the multi-utilities with specialized com-
panies.  
The final sample used in this analysis consists of an unbalanced panel data set 
including observations from 34 multi-utilities during the nine-year period spanning 
from 1997 to 2005. The sample represents about 60% of the integrated multi-utilities 
in Switzerland. According to our estimates based on the available information, the 
multi-utilities included in the sample cover about half of the national electricity and 
gas consumption provided by multi-utilities and about a fifth of the water distributed 
by multi-utilities. Overall, these companies cover approximately 13% of electricity, 
38% of gas and 14% of water distribution in the entire country.   
The model specification is based on a cost function with three outputs namely, 
the distributed electricity, gas and water and four input factors that is, labor and capi-
tal as well as the electricity and gas inputs. As in Sing (1987) customer density is in-
troduced as a service area characteristic. This variable should capture, at least par-
tially, the cost impact of the heterogeneity of the service area of the companies. In 
fact, differences in networks and environments influence the production process and 
therefore the costs. Obviously, the heterogeneity of the service area cannot be summa-
rized into a single variable. However, the available data do not allow for any other 
environmental or network characteristic that is reasonably independent of the included 
explanatory variables. Given the risk of multicollineraity in the translog function, es-
pecially in the second-order terms, we preferred to retain a relatively simple specifica-
tion.12 Thus, some of these characteristics are inevitably omitted from the cost func-
tion specification. As we see later these omitted factors are represented by firm-
specific stochastic components in the adopted panel data econometric models.  
 
12 In a preliminary analysis we introduced some other network characteristics such as the total length of 
the networks (gas, electricity, water), the share of the individual network on total network, the number 
of customers and the service area size. Unfortunately, we experienced numerical problems such as non-
convergence or degeneracy of one of the stochastic components. We recognize that the adopted speci-
fication only partly accounts for the observed heterogeneity.  
12 
Assuming that the technology is convex and the firm minimizes cost, the 
adopted total cost function can be written as: 
 
(1) (2) (3) (0) (1) (2) (3)( , , , , , , , , )tC C q q q r w w w w D= ,    (3) 
where C represents total costs; (1)q , (2)q  and (3)q  are respectively the distrib-
uted electricity, gas and water during the year, (0) (1) (2), ,w w w and (3)w  are respectively 
the input factor prices for capital and labor services and the purchased electricity and 
gas; r is the customer density13 measured by the number of customers in the electricity 
sector divided by the size of the service area measured in square kilometers; and tD  is 
a vector of year dummies that represent technical change and other year-to-year varia-
tions with the first year of the sample (1997) as the omitted category. The technical 
change is assumed to be neutral with respect to cost minimizing input ratios, that is, it 
is represented by a cost shift that does not alter the optimal input bundles.14 
An important implication of the above specification is that the estimated 
economies of scale are based on the usual assumption (in line with Caves et al., 1981) 
that any change in the production scale entails a uniform proportional change in all 
outputs and network characteristics, thus retaining the same ratios in particular the 
same customer density. This assumption is consistent with many policy applications 
such as the economic assessment of mergers and acquisitions and the extension of lo-
cal monopolists to new areas. However, the potential synergies could be understated 
in other cases such as the assessment of side-by-side competition, where considerable 
 
13 For the computation of the costumer density we used the number of costumers in the electricity sec-
tor. We have chosen the electricity sector, because is the sector with the largest number of costumers. 
This measure should approximated the customer density in all services (gas, water, electricity). Of 
course, we are aware that the inclusion of three different variables regarding the customer density 
would have been more appropriate. However, due to multicollinearity problem we were not able to 
adopt a richer model specification. 
14 As we will see later our regressions suggest that the time-variation of costs is not linear. These varia-
tions can be explained by many unobserved factors (such as changes in labor contracts or seasonal 
composition of the demand) that change uniformly across companies. 
13 
economies might also be achieved by increasing the density, namely the economies of 
density.15 Unfortunately, the sample’s independent variations in networks and outputs 
do not seem to be sufficient for a meaningful empirical distinction between the 
economies of scale and the economies of density. In fact, our preliminary analyses 
with several alternative specifications particularly, models including the size of the 
service area and/or the number of customers, indicated certain discrepancy in the 
signs and statistical significance of output coefficients, which can be explained by 
multicollinearity problems due to the strong correlation of output variables with those 
characteristics. 
The variables for the cost function specification were constructed as follows. 
Total costs (C) are calculated as the total firm’s expenditures in a given year. The out-
puts q(m) are measured by the total quantity delivered to the customers. The measure-
ment units are GWh for electricity and gas and million cubic meters for water. Input 
prices are defined as factor expenditures per factor unit.  
The capital price is the most difficult variable to measure because capital is 
purchased in one time period but delivers a flow of services over subsequent time pe-
riods. Moreover, in multi-utilities the capital intensity varies between activities (gas, 
electricity, water). From a theoretical point of view the best approach is to apply the 
methodology proposed by Jorgenson (1963) which is based on the measurement of 
capital stock by the capital inventory method and on a definition of capital price based 
on the relationship between the acquisition price of new capital goods and the present 
value of all future services received. Unfortunately, no data is available which would 
allow the application of this approach for each individual sector. Therefore, following 
Friedlaender and Chiang (1983), we used the residual approach for estimating the 
capital prices. The residual costs are specified as the company’s total costs net of la-
bor expenditures and purchases of electricity and natural gas.  
 
15 The economies of output (customer) density describe the effects of changes in output (number of 
customers) keeping all other network characteristics fixed (Caves et al., 1985; 1984). As illustrated in 
Farsi, Filippini and Kuenzle (2007, 2006), the economies of density are usually greater than the 
economies of scale.  
14 
Capital price for each network is obtained by dividing the residual costs by the 
capital stock measured by the network length. The overall capital price ( (0)w ) is then 
calculated as a weighted average of capital prices for each of the three sectors namely, 
electricity, natural gas and water. The weights, similar to Fraquelli, Piacenza et al. 
(2004), are proportional to the share of the residual costs in each sector out of the 
multi-utlity’s total residual costs. Labor price ( (1)w ) is defined as the ratio of annual 
labor costs to the total number of employees in terms of full time equivalent worker. 
In a few cases in which the full time equivalent was not available, in order to avoid 
the underestimation of labor price due to part-time employees, we considered a cor-
rection based on the mean labor price values within the same canton. The electricity 
and gas prices ( (2) (3),w w ) are defined as the expenditures of purchasing the input fac-
tors divided by the amount purchased (in MWh).  
Table 1 provides a descriptive summary of the variables included in the model. 
All the costs and prices are adjusted for inflation using consumer price index and are 
measured in year 2000 Swiss Francs (CHF). As can be seen in the table, the sample 
shows a considerable variation in costs and all three outputs. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (237 observations from 34 companies) 
 
Variable Min. Median Mean Max. 
C  Total costs 
(CHF Mio.) 
11.20 41.10 77.60 503.00 
(1)q  Electricity distri-
bution (GWh) 
38.78 126.89 293.23 2'023.59 
(2)q  Gas distribution 
(GWh) 
28.82 226.34 512.60 4'294.20 
(3)q  Water distribution  
(Mio. m3) 
0.78 2.45 5.28 33.35 
r  Customer density  
(customer/ km2) 
44.35 298.33 387.57 1'554.09 
(0)w  Capital price  
(CHF/ km) 
11'853 31'167 38'385 234'796 
(1)w  Labor price  
(CHF/ employee) 
77'789 106'466 107'851 146'816 
(2)w  Electricity price  
(CHF/ MWh) 
44.6 107.4 105.9 163.5 
(3)w  Gas price  
(CHF/ MWh) 
16.6 28.4 29.3 63.2 
 
Following Christensen et al. (1973) we use a translog model which is probably 
the most widely used functional form in empirical studies of cost and production func-
tions.16 This flexible functional form is a local, second-order approximation to any 
arbitrary cost function. The approximation point is usually set at the sample mean or 
median. Here the approximation point has been set at the sample median. Compared 
to the mean, the median values are less affected by outlier values. The translog form 
does not impose any restrictions on the elasticity of substitution and allows the 
economies of scale to vary with the output level. In order to avoid the excessive num-
ber of parameters we have considered a homothetic cost function in which the interac-
 
16 See Caves et al. (1980) on the advantages of translog form in multiproduct settings and Griffin et al. 
(1987) for a discussion of the criteria used for the choice of the functional form.  
16 
tion terms between input price variables and output variables are excluded.17 This 
brings about another assumption namely that marginal costs particularly cost com-
plementarities and scale elasticities depend only upon the technological characteristics 
of the production, thus being independent of input prices. This is a valid assumption 
insofar as the input prices remain in a reasonable range, especially because the poten-
tial changes in the shape of the cost function can easily be dominated by other ap-
proximations entailed by the functional form.  
It is generally assumed that the cost function is the result of cost minimization 
given input prices and output and should therefore satisfy certain properties. Mainly, 
this function must be non-decreasing in output and non-decreasing, concave and line-
arly homogeneous in input prices (Cornes, 1992). We imposed the latter condition by 
normalization of prices namely, by dividing the costs and all factor prices by one 
common factor price referred to as numeraire (cf. Farsi, Fetz et al., 2007b; Feather-
stone and Moss, 1994; Jara-Diaz, Martinez-Budria et al., 2003). Here we used the 
capital price as the numeraire. The remaining conditions can be tested based on the 
estimation results.   
The general econometric specification of the cost function in (3) can be written 
as:  
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17 We evaluated the possibility of applying a non-homothetic translog form. However, the relatively 
large number of parameters created certain numerical problems in some of the econometric models, 
especially the true random effects model that requires a simulated likelihood maximization method. 
This is perhaps related to problems due to the model’s over-identification and perhaps multicollinearity 
as suggested by the lack of significance and counter-intuitive signs for some of the main variables.  
17 
where subscripts i and t denote the company and year respectively; the pa-
rameters , , , ,m k mn kl tα β α β δ and 0α  ( , , , 1, 2,3; 1998,..., 2005m n k l t= = ) are the regression 
coefficients to be estimated; and all second-order parameters nmα  and klβ , satisfy the 
symmetry conditions ( ;kl lk mn nmβ β α α= = ); αi is a firm-specific effect; uit is an asym-
metric stochastic component term that captures the time-variant inefficiency and vit is 
a symmetric term representing random noise and statistical errors.  
We consider four variations of the above model. These models are summa-
rized in Table 2. The first model (Model I) is a random effects model in line with 
Schmidt and Sickles (1984), estimated using the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) 
method. Model II is a random effects model proposed by Pitt and Lee (1981) esti-
mated using the maximum likelihood method. In line with Kumbhakar and Lovell 
(2000) we will refer to this model as the maximum likelihood (ML) model. Model III 
is based on Battese and Coelli (1992) with an exponential decay function for ineffi-
ciency term.18 In both models I and II, it is assumed that all the unobserved differ-
ences across firms that do not vary over time are related to inefficiency. Model III re-
laxes the time-invariance by imposing a deterministic form of evolution that is uni-
form among all companies. In all three models, all the unobserved differences that 
cannot be captured by the random noise (vit) are assumed to be due to inefficiency.  
As we have seen in the previous section this could be a restrictive assumption 
in network industries especially in multi-utilities, which might entail a considerable 
cost variation through unobserved factors that vary from one network to another but 
are more or less constant over time and cannot be changed by the management. This 
implies that in these cases some of the unobserved heterogeneity, for instance, the 
complexity of the distribution network that is mainly determined by the topology of 
the service area, can be identified as inefficiency. In contrast, Model IV, the ‘true ran-
dom effects’ specification proposed by Greene (2005a,b), allows for a separate sto-
 
18 Battese and Coelli (1992, 1995) have proposed variations of this model with different distributions 
for ui, including truncated normal distribution. In this study we assume a half-normal distribution. 
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chastic term that captures the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. This model is 
estimated using Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML) method.19  
 
Table 2: Econometric specifications of the stochastic cost frontier 
 
Stochastic term 
Model I 
 
GLS 
(Schmidt and 
Sickles, 1984) 
 
Model II 
 
ML 
(Pitt and Lee, 1981) 
 
Model II 
 
ML 
(Battese and Coelli, 
1992) 
 
Model IV 
 
True RE 
(Greene, 
2005a,b) 
 
Firm-specific 
effect αi αi ~ iid (0, σα2) αi ~ N+(0, σα2) 0 αi ~ N(0, σα2) 
Time-varying 
inefficiency uit 0 0 
uit = 
ui exp{−η(t-Ti)} 
ui ~ N+(0, σu2) 
 
uit~N+(0, σu2) 
 
Random noise vit 
vit ~ iid (0, σv2) vit~ N (0, σv2) vit ~ N(0, σv2) vit~N(0, σv 2) 
 
Inefficiency es-
timate 
 
 
ˆ ˆmin{ }i iα α−  
 
 
1 2ˆ ˆE , ,  ...i i iα ω ω⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
with it i itvω α= +  
 
 
ˆE it itu ε⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
with εit= uit+ vit 
 
 
ˆE it itu r⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
with 
rit= αi+uit+vit 
 
 
- The hat symbol ^ is used to indicate the post-estimation predicted value. 
- Model I: The inefficiency is estimated compared to the ‘best-performance’ company with the 
minimum value of αi. 
- Model II: The inefficiency is estimated based on Jondrow et al. (1982). 
- Model III: 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆE E , ,  ..., exp{ ( )}it it i i i iT iu u t Tε ε ε ε η⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ; Ti denotes the period corre-
sponding with the last observation for company i. In this model company i starts with an initial 
level of inefficiency of ui0=uiexp(ηTi), that declines over time with an exponential rate of 
exp(-η) per period and reaches ui at the end of the sample period. 
- Model IV: The conditional expectation of inefficiency is calculated by Monte Carlo simula-
tions (Green, 2005b). 
 
Regarding the distribution assumptions, excepting the GLS model, the ineffi-
ciency term is assumed to follow a half-normal distribution which is obtained by a 
 
19 We used quasi-random Halton draws to minimize the potential sensitivity of the results to simulation 
process. Number of draws has been fixed to 1000. Our sensitivity analysis using several options sug-
gested that the estimation results are not sensitive when the number of draws is higher than a few hun-
dred. 
19 
zero-mean normal distribution truncated at zero. Dating back to the original frontier 
models (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and van der Broek, 1997), this assumption im-
plies that full efficiency is the most frequent outcome located at the mode of the dis-
tribution. Unlike the GLS model that is based on a single best performance, the half-
normal distribution provides a relatively solid benchmark performance observed in a 
relatively large number of cases. Moreover, consistent with the economic theory, that 
predicts the prevalence of rational and cost-minimizing behavior this distribution im-
plies that higher levels of inefficiency have lower incidence.  
All the adopted models assume that the stochastic terms namely, cost-
efficiency and unobserved heterogeneity are independent from each other and are both 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables included in the model. There are several 
methods to relax these assumptions. For instance the correlation between firm-specific 
effects and explanatory variables can be allowed by Mundlak’s specification (Farsi, 
Filippini and Greene, 2005; Farsi, Filippini and Kuenzle; 2005) or the impact of ex-
planatory variables on efficiency can be modeled by specifying the truncation point of 
the normal distribution as a function of observed factors (Kumbhakar et al., 1991; 
Battese and Coelli, 1995) or as a general functional form (Wang and Schmidt, 2002). 
However, such elaborations can only be achieved through more complicated and often 
arbitrary assumptions thus compromising the clarity of the original assumptions.  
 
4. Empirical results 
Table 3 lists the regression results of the cost frontier analysis, using the four 
alternative models as presented in Equation (4) and Table 2. All the estimated coeffi-
cients of the first-order terms have the expected signs and are statistically significant 
across all models. Given that all the variables except the dummy variables are in loga-
rithmic form, these coefficients can be directly interpreted as elasticities. The coeffi-
cients of first-order output variables (α1, α2, α3) represent the cost elasticities with 
respect to the corresponding outputs at the sample median. These coefficients indicate 
that the marginal costs of electricity distribution are considerably higher than those of 
natural gas, which in turn are substantially greater than those of water distribution.  
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Table 3: Estimation results  
 
Model I 
 
GLS (Schmidt-Sickles) 
Model II 
 
ML (Pitt-Lee) 
Model III 
 
ML (Battese-Coelli) 
Model IV 
 
True RE (Greene) 
1α  (Electricity output) 0.505 ** (.053) 0.460 ** (.069) 0.418 ** (.063) 0.527 ** (.020) 
2α  (Gas output) 0.317 ** (.032) 0.298 ** (.041) 0.245 ** (.045) 0.258 ** (.012) 
3α  (Water output) 0.092 ** (.039) 0.178 ** (.053) 0.212 ** (.047) 0.146 ** (.015) 
rα (Customer density) 0.064 ** (.027) 0.043  (.038) 0.026  (.037) 0.007  (.009) 
1β  (Labor price) 0.242 ** (.057) 0.229 ** (.054) 0.236 ** (.058) 0.201 ** (.027) 
2β  (Electricity price) 0.326 ** (.059) 0.317 ** (.051) 0.333 ** (.052) 0.370 ** (.033) 
3β  (Gas price) 0.234 ** (.043) 0.243 ** (.039) 0.223 ** (.038) 0.215 ** (.024) 
11α  0.646 ** (.197) 0.368 * (.221) 0.218  (.193) 0.231 ** (.086) 
22α  0.234 ** (.055) 0.154 * (.080) 0.067  (.071) 0.093 ** (.023) 
33α  0.287 ** (.141) 0.042  (.176) 0.186  (.167) 0.089 * (.052) 
αrr 0.019  (.061) -0.063  (.095) -0.233 ** (.089) -0.146 ** (.026) 
12α  -0.273 ** (.086) -0.182 * (.105) -0.048  (.091) -0.099 ** (.041) 
13α  -0.327 ** (.149) -0.124  (.158) -0.214  (.148) -0.133 ** (.058) 
α1r -0.215 ** (.070) -0.220 ** (.097) 0.074  (.104) -0.119 ** (.030) 
23α  -0.002  (.059) 0.049  (.072) 0.051  (.068) 0.037  (.026) 
α2r 0.123 ** (.059) -0.002  (.079) -0.147 * (.080) -0.065 ** (.027) 
α3r 0.085 * (.050) 0.120  (.081) 0.104  (.076) 0.122 ** (.020) 
β11 0.419  (.279) -0.031  (.270) 0.051  (.248) 0.384 ** (.121) 
β22 0.695 ** (.205) 0.524 ** (.172) 0.565 ** (.167) 0.758 ** (.110) 
β33 -0.243 ** (.120) -0.291 ** (.106) -0.278 ** (.110) -0.217 ** (.108) 
β12 -0.701 ** (.221) -0.419 ** (.197) -0.460 ** (.189) -0.724 ** (.102) 
β13 0.294 ** (.147) 0.422 ** (.137) 0.386 ** (.136) 0.351 ** (.096) 
β23 -0.096  (.135) -0.154  (.118) -0.156  (.115) -0.136  (.092) 
1998δ  -0.004  (.019) -0.005  (.015) 0.011  (.016) -0.005  (.032) 
1999δ  -0.003  (.020) -0.002  (.016) 0.028  (.019) -0.005  (.021) 
2000δ  -0.015  (.021) -0.013  (.018) 0.035  (.024) -0.006  (.025) 
2001δ  -0.014  (.023) -0.015  (.020) 0.049 * (.029) -0.012  (.022) 
2002δ  -0.037 * (.021) -0.036 ** (.018) 0.036  (.030) -0.040 * (.022) 
2003δ  -0.041 * (.021) -0.044 ** (.018) 0.039  (.033) -0.039 * (.023) 
2004δ  -0.064 ** (.023) -0.069 ** (.020) 0.032  (.038) -0.067 ** (.024) 
2005δ  -0.059 ** (.026) -0.065 ** (.023) 0.046  (.043) -0.073 ** (.022) 
0α  7.164 ** (.029) 6.989 ** (.032) 6.917 ** (.046) 7.120 ** (.019) 
σα .053   0.217 ** (.034)   0.114 ** (.005) 
σu      0.210 ** (.039) 0.081 ** (.030) 
σv .054   0.054 ** (.003) 0.052 ** (.003) 0.024 ** (.006) 
η       0.048 ** (.015)    
logL  Not Applicable (R2=0.982) 296.785   299.355   303.786   
** and * refer to 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
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The inverse of the sum of the three coefficients of first-order output variables 
represent a measure of global economies of scale at the sample median. The results 
indicate that this value is significantly greater than one suggesting global scale econo-
mies in the majority of the companies included in the sample. Many of the second-
order terms are also statistically significant, implying that the assumption of constant 
elasticities is unrealistic. The coefficients of the squared output terms (α11, α22, α33) 
are positive and mostly significant across all models. This suggests that a marginal 
increase in a given output increases the cost elasticity of that output. Therefore, as ex-
pected, the (product-specific) economies of scale are decreasing in output.  
As we see in Table 3 the output cross-interaction terms (α12, α13, α23) are 
mostly negative across the models. In particular, the cross effect between electricity 
and other two outputs (natural gas and water), is statistically significant, suggesting 
lower marginal costs in one sector as a result of increasing output in the other sector. 
The results show however that the cost complementarity between gas and water out-
puts (α23) is not statistically significant. This lack of significance could be explained 
by the relatively low marginal cost of both outputs which cause statistical problems in 
detecting the second-order decreasing effect.   
As for the effect of customer density, the results show that the first order term 
is positive but statistically insignificant in most models. This suggests that the effect 
at the median company is probably not important. However, the mostly negative coef-
ficient of the square term (αrr) suggests that higher densities could have a decreasing 
effect on costs. At first impression, this can be considered as counter-intuitive because 
increasing the customer density may be economical in low-density areas, but could 
create extra costs in congested areas. However, the statistically significant interaction 
terms between customer density and outputs, suggest that the density has a strongly 
non-linear effect depending on the output combination across the three services.  
For instance the interaction term with electricity output (α1r) is mostly nega-
tive and significant, suggesting that the marginal cost of electricity output is lower in 
networks with higher customer density. This cannot be said for gas and water outputs. 
Especially the corresponding interaction term for water distribution (α3r) is mostly on 
the positive side, suggesting that an increase in customer density will increase the 
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marginal cost of water distribution. These results can be related to different costs of 
network connection for various outputs, and also different amount of extra cables and 
pipes required for the provision of greater volumes of electricity, gas and water, de-
pending on the actual customer density. For instance, in a dense and crowded area 
providing more electricity might be handled easier than a considerable increase in gas 
and water output. Moreover, connection of new customers to electricity networks is 
probably less costly than that of water and gas distribution networks. 
The coefficients of the first-order terms of input prices are an indicator of the 
share of each factor price at the sample median.20 Based on the regression results, the 
shares of labor, electricity and gas inputs respectively amount to about 22, 33 and 23 
percent of the total costs. These numbers are comparable to the sample mean of the 
observed factor shares which is 12, 35 and 17 percent of the company’s total costs, 
respectively for labor, electricity and gas inputs. As we see the share of electricity and 
gas expenses are quite close the average observed values. The remaining costs have 
been considered as ‘capital’ costs that are 36 percent on average, but about 22 percent 
from the regression results. Therefore in the model, the share of labor costs is over-
stated compared to that of the residual capital costs.  
We explored if the estimated cost functions satisfy the theoretical properties 
implied by cost-minimization. As shown by the positive coefficients of the first order 
terms (Table 3), all the estimated cost functions are non-decreasing in output and in-
put prices at the approximation point (sample median). However, our calculations 
showed that the Hessian matrix defined by the second derivatives of the translog cost 
function with respect to log of input prices, is not negative semi-definite. The viola-
tion of this necessary condition21 for concavity might be considered as an indication 
 
20 Note that in translog form, any statement about sample points other than the approximation point 
(here, sample median), should consider the second-order terms in addition to the main effects. 
21 As pointed out by Diewert and Wales (1987), even with a negative semi-definite Hessian matrix for 
the translog cost function, the costs might be concave with respect to input prices. So applying such a 
condition on the coefficient matrix of a translog cost function is too strong for concavity in input prices.  
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that the concavity in input prices is not satisfied. This result can be explained by the 
fact that these local monopolies do not face any competitive pressure,22 but also that 
the multi-utilities are not as sensitive to price changes as the textbook economic the-
ory might predict. Theoretically the companies are expected to substitute labor with 
capital or capital with energy in response to changes in the relative prices. However, 
in practice these substitutions are not feasible in many cases. For instance if the rela-
tive price of electricity to gas increases, the companies cannot substitute electricity 
input with gas input, because these inputs are mainly determined by the demand side.  
In any case, even if we consider the lack of concavity in input prices as an in-
dication that the companies do not fully minimize their costs the estimated cost func-
tions can be useful to study the marginal effects of different factors on costs and also 
to compare the companies’ performance. In such cases, as pointed out by Bös (1986) 
and Breyer (1987), functions based on cost optimization can still be used as ‘behav-
ioral’ cost functions and can be helpful in studying the firms’ behavior. Moreover, we 
should keep in mind that we are estimating a cost frontier function, which allow the 
possibility that some companies do not minimize their costs. 
The estimates of inefficiency scores obtained from the four models are sum-
marized in Table 4. As expected, compared to all other models, the True RE model’s 
estimates provide generally lower inefficiency. According to this model the multi-
utilities have on average about 6 percent excess costs compared to the fully efficient 
production whereas the other models predict from 18 to 21 percent excess cost on av-
erage. The median inefficiency for the True RE model is about 5%, while being about 
20% for all other models. It should be noted that the True RE model’s estimates do 
not include the persistent inefficiencies that might remain more or less constant over 
time. To the extent that there are certain sources of inefficiency that result in time-
invariant excess costs, the estimates of the True RE model should provide a reason-
able lower bound for the companies’ inefficiency. On the other hand, in all the three 
other models, it is assumed that all the time-invariant cost differences due to exoge-
 
22 This explanation was duly pointed out to us by an anonymous referee. 
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nous heterogeneity are accounted for by the observed explanatory variables included 
in the model, and whatever remains can be interpreted as inefficiency. Therefore, the 
overall estimates of inefficiency obtained from these models can be considered as a 
kind of upper bound for the actual level of inefficiency in the sector.  
 
Table 4: Descriptive summary of inefficiency estimates 
 
 Model I 
 
GLS (Schmidt-Sickles) 
Model II 
 
ML (Pitt-Lee) 
Model III 
 
ML (Battese-Coelli) 
Model IV 
 
True RE (Greene) 
Mean 0.184 0.183 0.216 0.063 
Std. Deviation 0.079 0.119 0.143 0.043 
Minimum 0.000 0.013 0.014 0.010 
1st Quartile 0.144 0.060 0.075 0.031 
Median 0.202 0.207 0.214 0.050 
3rd Quartile 0.251 0.275 0.303 0.082 
Maximum 0.303 0.401 0.699 0.277 
 
This interpretation of lower/upper bounds of inefficiency should be considered 
with special caution if applied to individual companies. The main problem is in dis-
tinguishing the persistent inefficiencies from external heterogeneity, thus from the ex-
cess costs that vary over time. The persistent inefficiencies might vary considerably 
from one company to another. From a regulator’s point of view it is important to pe-
nalize the companies whose efficiency does not improve. Yet it is probably more im-
portant to make sure that the estimated excess costs are due to inefficiency rather than 
external factors beyond the management’s control. A case-by-case analysis of indi-
vidual inefficiency for a given company across several models and its variation over 
time can be quite informative.     
The distribution of the inefficiency estimates in the sample is depicted in 
Figure 1. The distribution densities have been smoothed using Kernel density method. 
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As seen in the figure the extent of inefficiency in the True RE model is considerably 
narrower than in other models. Moreover, the distribution of the GLS estimates sug-
gest a negative skewness, which contradicts the usual assumption of positive skew-
ness in cost-inefficiencies. Moreover, both Models II and III indicate a tendency to-
ward a bimodal distribution, which goes against the underlying half-normal distribu-
tion assumption in these models. These peculiar patterns might be indicative that the 
econometric specification of the error term in the first three models could be insuffi-
cient to capture the inefficiencies in a coherent way. This can be explained by unob-
served cost differences that are not due to inefficiency but to other external factors.   
 
Figure 1: Distribution of inefficiency estimates 
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In order to explore if the efficiency estimates provide a consistent ranking pat-
tern across different modes, we studied the correlation coefficients between these es-
timates. Table 5 provides the correlation matrix of inefficiency scores across the four 
models. The results suggest a high positive correlation among the first three models. 
There is however a relatively low correlation between each one of these models and 
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the True RE model. The Spearman rank correlation matrix shows slightly lower corre-
lation in general but confirms the above pattern namely low correlation between 
Model IV and the other three models, and high correlation among the latter models. 
This result suggests that even if we are only interested in efficiency ranking rather 
than the numerical level of inefficiency, using the inadequate model can give a mis-
leading ordering of individual companies.   
 
Table 5: Pearson correlation matrix between inefficiency estimates 
 
  
Model I 
 
GLS (Schmidt-Sickles) 
Model II 
 
ML (Pitt-Lee) 
Model III 
 
ML (Battese-Coelli) 
Model IV 
 
True RE (Greene) 
I 1 0.863** 0.715** 0.124* 
II  1 0.793** 0.140** 
III   1 0.128** 
 ** and * refer to 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that in frontier models (such as models I to III) 
that define the inefficiency based on time-invariant individual effects, any unex-
plained cost difference between companies is automatically associated with ineffi-
ciency. This explains why the spread of inefficiencies is narrower in Model IV (Figure 
1). The latter model ensures that only asymmetric time-variant part of the excess costs 
is captured by the inefficiency term. That explains why this model is singled out in the 
correlation patterns shown in Table 5. Given the above discussions and the fact that 
the network industries are characterized by important spatial firm-specific characteris-
tics that are only partially observable, we contend that the True RE model (Model IV) 
provides more reliable measures of inefficiency for multi-utilities.  
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5. Conclusions 
This study presents an empirical analysis of cost inefficiency in a sample of 
Swiss multi-utilities operating in the distribution of electricity, natural gas and water. 
The issues addressed in the study involve an important question related to the applica-
tion of benchmarking analysis in incentive regulation schemes for multi-utilities. In 
general, the benchmarking of multiple-output companies is more complicated than in 
utilities with a similar output. Operating in several different sectors, multi-utilities 
hence are characterized by a strong unobserved heterogeneity that makes the meas-
urement of their performance an important challenge for the regulators.  
It is shown that the recent methodological developments in the estimation of 
cost frontier functions using panel data methods can be helpful to achieve more reli-
able estimates of inefficiency in presence of unobserved and omitted factors. The pre-
vious studies have used some of these methods in single-network distributors such as 
electricity and gas. However to our knowledge there is no reported empirical applica-
tion in the multi-utility sector. The present analysis serves as a first illustration of the 
difficulties involved in the estimation of efficiency in multi-network utilities. 
Using a translog cost function and several stochastic frontier models this anal-
ysis indicates the presence of unexploited global scale economies in the majority of 
the companies included in the sample. The efficiency estimates are sensitive to the 
econometric specification of unobserved factors through the model’s stochastic com-
ponents. While highlighting the potential problems in benchmarking multi-utilities, 
this study shows that adequate panel data models can be used to identify the ineffi-
cient companies and determine to certain extent, which part of their excess costs has 
been persistent and which part has varied over time.  
Combining several frontier models also allows two types of inefficiency esti-
mates: a “lower bound” estimate that includes only the transient part of the firm’s ex-
cess costs assuming that all persistent cost differences are due to unobserved factors 
rather than poor efficiency performance, and an “upper bound” that associates all the 
firm-specific unaccounted cost differences to their productive efficiency and neglects 
the effect of external unobserved factors. Both estimates could be useful for the regu-
lator, as they can use them to identify the companies that are persistently more costly 
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than others and those that have high time-variant inefficiency. The regulator should 
perform further detailed and possibly case-by-case studies to assess to what extent the 
excessive costs of the former group can be associated with productive inefficiency 
and identify the potential external factors and peculiarities that might have caused 
such excessive costs.  
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